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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 13, 2007, former United States Senator George Mitchell
released the 409-page Report to the Commissioner of Baseball of an
Independent Investigation into the Illegal Use of Steroids and Other
Performance Enhancing Substances by Players in Major League Baseball,
popularly known as the Mitchell Report.' This document was the
culmination of a nearly twenty-month investigation by the former senator
into the use of banned performance-enhancing substances in Major League
Baseball (MLB).2 The report alleged that eighty-nine players, including some
of the game's most well-known and respected stars, had used banned
performance-enhancing substances in the past.3
Senator Mitchell's work was perhaps the most thorough of a long series
of investigations and reports regarding the abuse of performance-enhancing
substances by Major League Baseball players.4 What may have been
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I would
like to thank my family, friends, and Nicole for their support throughout these past three
years, as well as the staff, authors, and faculty advisors of the Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution for a great experience as Editor in Chief.
I GEORGE J. MITCHELL & DLA PIPER US LLP, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF
BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND
OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL (Office of the Commissioner of Baseball 2007), available at
http://files.mlb.com/mitchrpt.pdf. [hereinafter Mitchell Report]; see Duff Wilson &
Michael S. Schmidt, Report Ties Star Players to Baseball's 'Steroids Era, 'N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2007, at Al.
2 Wilson & Schmidt, supra note 1, at Al.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Bill Pennington, Baseball Bars Longtime Star for Steroid Use, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, at Al (detailing the league's decision to ban Baltimore Orioles
player Rafael Palmeiro after his testimony before Congress); Jack Curry, Comments
Make Giambi a Target of Investigators, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at D3 (explaining
that although New York Yankees player Jason Giambi was one of the only players to
publicly admit steroid use at the time of Senator Mitchell's investigations, it was highly
unlikely that he would cooperate with Senator Mitchell's investigation). Although he has
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regarded even five years ago as a few separate instances of bad behavior has
now evolved into the league's most pressing issue, with fans and players
alike wondering who will be implicated next.5 The response of MLB, once
criticized for being slow, was reinvigorated by Commissioner Bud Selig.6
Once accused of ignoring the problem of steroid abuse in the league, MLB's
administration requested that Senator Mitchell conduct his investigations and
publish the report. Recent investigations and reports have made it clear that
baseball's league office is committed to rooting out those who have abused
performance-enhancing drugs in the past, even if the offenders were some of
the league's most popular stars. 7
The investigation process is not without its own critics--particularly
among players.8 There have been considerable questions regarding both the
method of the league's investigations and possible biases on the part of the
never tested positive for any banned substance, Barry Bonds' case is arguably the most
infamous steroid investigations in baseball's recent history. See Murray Chass, Selig Puts
Bonds and Book Under Further Review, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at D1. Bonds was
discussed extensively in the Mitchell Report. See Mitchell Report, supra note 1, at 128-
30. Bonds had faced investigation and scrutiny from Major League Baseball even before
the publication of the Mitchell Report after he was accused of having abused steroids and
other banned substances in "Game of Shadows," a book written by two San Francisco
Chronicle reporters. See Bill Nowlin, A Compelling Summary of the Steroids Scandal,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11, 2006, at C14; Mitchell Report, supra note 1, at SR- 17.
5 Former MLB star Ken Caminiti was quoted in the Mitchell Report as suggesting
that as many as half of all major league players are using some kind of banned,
performance-enhancing substances. See Mitchell Report, supra note 1, at SR-2.
6 See Duff Wilson, Selig Wants Punishment Toughened on Steroids Use, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2005, at DI; Bob Wolfley, Selig Says New Drug Policy is Near,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 8, 2005, at C6.
7 The New York Times recently reported that Sammy Sosa had tested positive for
banned substances in 2003. Michael S. Schmidt, Another Blow to Epic Chase - Sosa is
Said to Have Tested Positive in 2003, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 2009, at B 11. Sosa, along
with Mark McGwire, is generally credited as having "saved" baseball following a general
strike by the Players Association in 1994 and 1995. Id. In February of this year, it was
revealed that Alex Rodriguez, the highest-paid player in baseball, tested positive for
steroids in 2003. Michael S. Schmidt, Rodriguez Said to Test Positive in 2003, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2009, at Al.
8 Many players feel as though they are being collectively investigated merely
because of the publicity surrounding the Barry Bonds investigation and its coincidence
with his chase of the all-time home-run record. See Mel Antonen, Players Don't See
Purpose of Drug Probe, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 31, 2006, at 18C ("Outfielder Torii Hunter
of the Minnesota Twins called the investigation 'stupid' and said there would be no
investigation if Bonds weren't chasing the all-time home run record."). Other players
contend that the focus should be on other sports, such as the National Football League.
Id.
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investigators. 9 Perhaps most ominously, the MLB investigation into-and,
inherently, the arbitration process associated with-the abuse of
performance-enhancing drugs has been decried as something of a "witch
hunt."10 It has been suggested that the league office is more concerned about
presenting evidence to the public of action being taken than with the actual
truth of the allegations." Moreover, tensions between the league office and
the Players Association may be at an all-time high. An excerpt from the
Mitchell Report adequately illustrates the tensions in the atmosphere already:
The Players Association was largely uncooperative. (1) It rejected totally
my requests for relevant documents. (2) It permitted one interview with its
executive director, Donald Fehr; my request for an interview with its chief
operating officer, Gene Orza, was refused. (3) It refused my request to
interview the director of the Montreal laboratory that analyzes drug tests
under baseball's drug program but permitted her to provide me with a letter
addressing a limited number of issues. (4) I sent a memorandum to every
active player in Major League Baseball encouraging each player to contact
me or my staff if he had any relevant information. The Players Association
sent out a companion memorandum that effectively discouraged players
from cooperating. Not one player contacted me in response to my
memorandum. (5) I received allegations of the illegal possession or use of
performance enhancing substances by a number of current players. Through
their representative, the Players Association, I asked each of them to meet
with me so that I could provide them with information about the allegations
and give them a chance to respond. Almost without exception they declined
to meet or talk with me. 12
9 See Jack Curry, Mitchell Offers Few Details about Steroids Investigation, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2006, at D3 (Senator Mitchell's report contains little information
regarding how information was collected, how sources were located, or specifically how
players were identified-beyond the initial accusations. Although Mitchell has promised
that details will be forthcoming, none have been given yet); Michael S. Schmidt & Duff
Wilson, Orioles Speak up Against Mitchell Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, at Dl
(Nineteen of the eighty-nine players listed in the Mitchell report played for the Baltimore
Orioles. The Orioles were the first team to publicly criticize the manner in which
information was gathered and accusations leveled.).
10 Bob Nightengale, Sheffield Unfazed by Probe, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 27, 2007, at
IC (Detroit Tigers player Gary Sheffield refused to cooperate with the Mitchell
investigation, claiming that the Players Association had told him it was a "witch hunt"
and that the entire purpose of the investigation was to "get [Bonds]").
1 I1d; See also Antonen, supra note 8, at 18C. Some players have intimated that the
league is only concerned with putting on an appearance of action now because of the
scandal surrounding Barry Bonds, and would not be acting but for the amount of public
scrutiny surrounding Bonds. Id.
12 Mitchell Report, supra note 1, at SR-7.
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Certainly in the 2009 season and most likely for the near future,
substance abuse will be at the forefront of the mind of each baseball fan.13 It
would be difficult to think that the Commissioner's office does not feel at
least some pressure to continue its investigations into substance abuse to
prove to fans that efforts are being taken to curb what has become a massive
blemish for the game of baseball. As more players are implicated in the
scandal for both past and present use, MLB needs to consider both the design
and procedural rules of the arbitration system that will handle most of these
disputes if the players wish to challenge the league's ruling. When
considering any changes that should be made to their own arbitration system,
MLB can learn from the challenges faced by another athletic institution that
was forced to create an arbitration system to deal with substance abuse
issues: the International Olympic Committee (IOC).14 The mistakes that the
IOC made in designing its own arbitration systems-the same mistakes that
forced the IOC to create the International Council of Arbitration for Sport to
assure athletes of its neutrality-can be avoided with some changes to
MLB's arbitration system design.
This note will suggest that MLB should re-examine its arbitration
process in three key areas. The first is the selection of the arbitrators and/or
arbitration panels that will be eligible to preside over a substance abuse
dispute between the league office and a player. As I will discuss below, the
Mitchell Report has already been an example of how not to select neutral
parties that will provide actual and apparent neutrality in arbitrating these
disputes. Next, MLB should consider the time frames that it requires all
substance abuse investigations and arbitrations to adhere to. Although the
MLB must consider some time limits in making its decision, the current
arbitration procedures place an unfair burden upon players in deciding how
to handle a positive substance abuse test. Finally, the structure of MLB's
arbitration procedure is divided into two main institutions - the Health Policy
Advisory Committee and the league's standard salary dispute arbitration
panel. MLB should join these two halves to create one specialized, cohesive
arbitration forum that has the expertise to deal with the very unique
arbitration challenges presented by a substance abuse situation.
13 See, e.g., Ross Newhan, Forget Cheaters Never Prosper, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2007, at D1 ("In the end, the report is actually a beginning-or a continuation, at least-
of an era pockmarked by needles, littered with phony prescription slips.").
14 See Court of Arbitration for Sport, History of the CAS, http://www.tas-
cas.org/history (last visited August 5, 2009). Although salary arbitration in baseball is an
older institution, the International Olympic Committee was the pioneering body of large
scale arbitration proceedings to deal with abuse of performance-enhancing substances. Id.
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II. ARBITRATOR SELECTION FROM THE MITCHELL REPORT AND
ONWARDS
Major League Baseball is not the first sports organization to face
criticism for its substance abuse arbitration process. The International
Olympic Committee pioneered the practice of referring such cases to
arbitration when it created the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). 15
Although the IOC enjoyed some success in curbing the use of performance-
enhancing substances during the height of their investigatory activity (or
possibly encouraging the development of newer, harder to detect drugs), the
organization soon began to face criticisms about the purpose, fairness, and
structure of its arbitration system. 16 These criticisms eventually led to the
creation of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS)--the
body that still monitors the Court of Arbitration for Sport's arbitration
process today.17
A. The International Olympic Committee 's Initial Arbitration
Procedure, Faced with Criticism over its Independence and Fairness,
was Forced to Alter the Entire System Design
Beginning in the 1980s, the increased number of sports-related disputes
led some to call for the creation of a new judicial body that would specialize
in handling sports-related arbitration. 18 Olympics enthusiasts pointed to the
Cold War and the United States' boycott of the 1980 Moscow games as
evidence that a neutral body was needed to arbitrate disputes among the
increasingly numerous parties that were involved in the international sports
15 Id. The use of performance enhancing drugs has a long history in connection with
the Olympic Games. See Michele Verroken, Drug Use and Abuse in Sport, in DRUGS IN
SPORT 18,23 (David R. Mottram ed., 1996). The IOC has banned anabolic steroids since
1974, when the technology to detect those substances was first developed. Id. at 23. At
that time, the most popular substance abuse was in the form of amphetamines, which
athletes often took on the day of competition and were notorious for causing collapses
and death due to heart failure. Id. at 19-20.
16 Id.
17 The ICAS has been largely successful in its mission-to monitor the activity of
the CAS and ensure its independence as a private judicial body. See generally Nancy K.
Raber, Dispute Resolution in Olympic Sport: The Court ofArbitration for Sport, 8 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS L. 75, 90 (1998) ("As a practical matter, recent CAS decisions favorable
to athletes may indicate CAS independence from the IOC.").
18 See History of the CAS, supra note 14.
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setting.19 The need for such an institution was twofold: the prospect of quick,
relatively inexpensive arbitration was needed for the Olympics' assemblage
of amateur athletes, and the absence of an international judicial body that
specifically concentrated on sports-related disputes was a growing problem,
one which the IOC believed required a whole area of concentration of its
own.20 At the 1982 IOC meeting in Rome, Juan Antonio Samaranch, the
president of the IOC, tapped Judge Keba Mbaye to chair a committee that
would be charged with drafting the first set of jurisdictional and procedural
regulations of the new judicial body.2 1
The Court of Arbitration for Sport came into effect on June 30, 1984-
less than a month before the start of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games.22 At
first, the majority of the cases heard by the CAS concerned the abuse of
performance-enhancing substances-both as the first judicial body to hear
such a case and as an appellate court reviewing punishment decisions that
had been handed down by other judicial institutions. 23 Its reputation as a fair
and independent judicial body grew and it was soon hearing cases regarding
everything from "the determination of athlete nationality and the validity of
employment contracts, to equally varied commercial cases involving
television broadcast, sponsorship[,] and licensing rights." 24 Perhaps because
19 Darren Kane, Twenty Years on: An Evaluation of the Court of Arbitration for
Sport, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004 455,456 (Ian S. Blackshaw
et al. eds., 2006). The leader of this movement was the charismatic new chairman of the
International Olympic Committee, Juan Antonio Samaranch. See Matthieu Reeb, The
Court of Arbitration for Sport: History and Operation, in RECUEIL DES SENTENCES DU
TAS, DIGEST OF CAS AwARDs III 2001-2003 xxvii-xxviii (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2004).
Almost immediately after his election to the position, Samaranch began to lobby for the
creation for a new judicial body that would deal exclusively with sports-related disputes.
Id.
20 See Kane, supra note 19, at 456 ("This body was required to be independent from
international and national sporting federations (IFs and NFs), and thus needed to avoid
the influence of such federations in their adjudicative decision-making, particularly when
hearing appeals."); see also Matthieu Reeb, The Role and Functions of the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004,
supra note 19, at 31 ("[A]n international court like the CAS, which can offer specialist
knowledge, low cost[,] and rapid action, provides a means of resolving sports disputes
adapted to the specific needs of the international sporting community.").
21 See Reeb, supra note 19, at xxvii-xxviii.
22 See History of the CAS, supra note 14.
23 Kane, supra note 19, at 457. The fact that the CAS was faced with substance
abuse cases upon its inception is not surprising considering the circumstances.
24 Id. One of the main attractions of the newly-formed CAS was that it could hear
such a wide variety of cases. This was consistent with Samaranch's idea that sports law
was so vast that it would require its own substantive body-what had in the past been
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the CAS offered over sixty arbitrators to handle a wide range of disputes, it
was the exclusive court of arbitration for all International Olympic
Committee claims and also handled appeals cases from the Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and other sports bodies. 25
From its outset, the CAS adopted a system of regulations that provided a
description of the structure of the CAS arbitration panels, the selection
process for arbitrators, jurisdictional rules, and the basic procedural rules that
all CAS arbitration panels were bound to follow.26 All members of the CAS
had to "be recognized as competent in the field of sport" and have some sort
of legal education.27 Originally, there were to be forty members, although
this was later increased to sixty at the direction of the IOC Executive Board
in 1986.28 The CAS members were to also be selected according to their
geographic origin-a feature that some have suggested was borrowed from
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.29 In keeping with the very
first article of the CAS statutes, jurisdiction depended on the whether or not
the cases "may bear on questions of principle relating to sport or on
pecuniary or other interests affected on the occasion of the practice or the
development of sport."'30 For years, the CAS was widely lauded for its
collection of sports law experts from around the world as well as its novel
approach to dealing with issues that otherwise would have been arbitrated by
national bodies-leaving athletes to deal with a patchwork of national laws
called the "lex sportiva". See JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 63 (2d
ed. 2003); but cf Allan Erbsen, The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva, in THE
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 19, at 441-54 (alleging that
rather than embodying the already existing lex sportiva principles, the CAS has created
its own substantive common law).
25 FIFA statutes identify the CAS as the judicial body for all appeals from FIFA
decisions. FIFA Statutes Section VIII, Article 62, available at
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/statutes.html.
26 See Kane, supra note 19, at 457-58. The idea that the CAS would create its own
common law was seen by some as antithetical to what the purpose of the CAS should
have been-to state what the lex sportiva was rather than come up with new principles.
See Erbsen, supra note 24, at 441-54.
27 The almost immediate need for an increase in the number of available arbitrators
is a good indicator of how popular the newly-formed CAS was. Bruno Simma, The Court
of Arbitration for Sport, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra
note 19, at21, 23.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 24.
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instead of a fairly consistent set of regulations. 31 It was the forum of choice
for a number of international athletes and generally enjoyed an unblemished
record as to its fairness and impartiality.
B. Elmer Gundel and the Need for Reform of the CAS Arbitration
System
In 1993, the ability of the CAS to deliver unbiased, fair decisions was
seriously questioned by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Gundel v. Federation
Equestre International.32 The FEI, a European horse-racing league, had
found that Elmer Gundel, a rider from Germany, had injected both himself
and his horse with performance-enhancing substances at a major
international equestrian event.33 Gundel appealed his three-month suspension
to the CAS and actually had his sentence reduced by two months. 34 Still not
happy with the CAS decision, Gundel appealed his case to the Swiss Federal
Tribunal.35 Swiss law requires that for any court to be considered a proper
arbitration court, it must meet certain standards pertaining to impartiality and
independence. 36 Although the Swiss court technically did not issue a
definitive statement on the impartiality of the CAS, the decision clearly
questioned whether or not the CAS could be considered an independent body
when it was so closely linked to and funded by the IOC. The message to the
IOC was clear-make changes to the CAS structure or be prepared to have
its decisions overturned in Swiss Federal Court.37
One of the main issues that the court focused on was the method through
which the CAS selected its arbitrators. 38 Under the original 1983 plan, each
of four bodies would be able to select fifteen of the sixty arbitrators to be
included on the roster-the IOC, the International Federations for Olympic
Sports, the National Olympic Committees, and the IOC President.39 This
31 See Ian Blackshaw, Sport's Court Getting Right Results, THE GUARDIAN, June 3,
2004, at 31 ("Since [1984] it has become a highly respected, fair[,] and effective forum
for settling speedily and inexpensively a wide range of sports disputes.").
32 Official Digest of Federal Tribunal Judgments, 119 II 271; see also Matthieu
Reeb, Introduction, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1I 1998-2000 xxix (Matthieu Reeb ed.,
2001).
33 Reeb, supra note 20, at 33-34.
3 4 Id. at 33.
3 5 Id.
36
Id.
37 See id. at 33-34.
38 Id.
39 See Kane, supra note 19, at 457.
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formula meant that all sixty arbitrators were selected by some kind of
Olympic commission-the athletes themselves had no input as to who would
be hearing their cases. The arbitrators were also appointed to terms of only
four years and the President of the IOC had "considerable" power in deciding
which members would be reappointed. 40 The Swiss Court also questioned the
funding structure of the CAS. Specifically, the court noted that the arbitration
panels, although relatively inexpensive, were almost exclusively funded by
the Executive Board of the IOC.4 1
Because of the Gundel decision, the IOC instituted major reforms in
1994.42 The previous system of statutes and regulations was revised to create
a new "Code of Sports-Related Arbitration" on November 22, 1994. 43 The
Code created a new financing structure for the CAS that would, in theory,
leave no doubt as to the independence of the CAS from the IOC and its
powerful President, Samaranch. 44 The Code also featured a bifurcated
format: the structural and financial reforms were contained in the "Statutes of
the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes" and the
new procedural guides for CAS members would be in the "Procedural Rules"
section.45
The biggest change to result from the 1994 modifications to the CAS was
the formation of a completely new body-the International Council of
Arbitration for Sport (ICAS). 46 The ICAS has been described as:
[T]he supreme organ of the CAS. It is a foundation under Swiss law. The
main task of the ICAS is to safeguard the independence of the CAS and the
rights of the parties. To this end, it looks after the administration and
financing of the CAS. The ICAS is composed of 20 members who must all
be high-level jurists well-acquainted with the issues of arbitration and sports
law.47
Perhaps more importantly, the ICAS does not include any members selected
by the IOC.48 Its members are selected by the already-existing members and
the board is elected without any input from the IOC.49 These changes largely
40 Reeb, supra note 20, at 33.
41 Id
42 See History of the CAS, supra note 14.
43 Reeb, supra note 20, at 34.
44Id.
45 See NAFZIGER, supra note 24, at 43.
46 Id.
47 Reeb, supra note 20, at 35.
48 See id.
49 Id.
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accomplished the goal of separating the CAS arbitrators from the IOC to a
large enough degree that the Swiss courts have since affirmed its
independence in several decisions. 50
C. MLB Should Examine its own Arbitrator Selection Process and
System Design to Avoid the Criticisms Leveled at the IOC in the Wake
of the Gundel Case
The Mitchell Report has proven to have another useful function for MLB
besides identifying past steroids abusers-it serves as a clear warning of the
problems that can arise when the investigators and arbitrators involved in
substance abuse arbitration have their neutrality called into question. It did
not take much time for both the athletes involved and the media to question
whether Senator Mitchell's own personal connections to baseball might have
had an effect on his investigation.5' Senator Mitchell, albeit well before the
time of his investigation, was a director of the Boston Red Sox baseball
club. 52 The fact that no current Red Sox players were named in the Mitchell
report raised even more tensions with other teams that felt they had been
unfairly targeted.53 In addition to his work with the Red Sox, Mitchell served
50 See Emile Vrijman, Experiences with Arbitration Before the CAS: Objective
Circumstances or Purely Individual Impressions?, in COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
1984-2004, supra note 19, at 65 (There had been some question as to the continued
impartiality of the CAS, mostly because of its use of a closed list of approved
arbitrators-parties were not free to suggest an arbitrator from outside the list-and the
payment of the travel and accommodation expenses of CAS arbitrators by the 1OC. The
Swiss Federal Supreme Court found that it was "unlikely" that these payments were
affecting the independence of the arbitrators).
51 See Childs Walker, A Bit Too Connected?: Mitchell's Ties to Red Sox, ESPN
Raising Concerns, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 12, 2007, at 4Z. As this article notes, the
majority of the criticism leveled at Senator Mitchell has not suggested that he was
necessarily impartial or unfair in his investigation, but rather asked why MLB
Commissioner Bud Selig would leave any room for doubt by selecting an individual with
so many personal ties and interests. These concerns were raised before the Mitchell
Report was ever published. See Tim Brown, Mitchell's Baseball Ties Raise Questions,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at D1.
52 See Walker, supra note 51, at 4Z. Senator Mitchell does mention the fact that he
was a director of the Boston Red Sox, in addition to several other personal ties to
baseball, in an appendix to the report. See Mitchell Report, supra note 1, at A-1. In
addition to being connected to the Red Sox, Mitchell was on the board of the Disney
Corporation when it owned part of the Anaheim Angels, and for one year sat on the board
of directors for the Florida Marlins. Id.
53 See Walker, supra note 51, at 4Z. It is perhaps most disturbing that the rivalries
between certain MLB franchises was a reason for some to doubt the bias-free nature of
622
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as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Disney Corporation until the
January before his investigation began. 54 Disney is a partial owner of the
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN), which is a major
broadcast partner of MLB. 55
Whether or not Senator Mitchell's personal connections to MLB had any
effect on his investigation and report is outside the purview of this note.
What is important to focus on, however, is that MLB can avoid questions of
impropriety in the future through a more careful selection of which
individuals are going to be involved in the substance abuse arbitration
process. In the arbitration process, the mere appearance of bias on the part of
the arbitrator can be as damaging to the reputation of the system's fairness as
actual bias.56 For MLB's purposes, where the appearance of a fair and just
procedure is critical to appeasing both players and fans, the importance of
neutral arbitrator selection is of the utmost importance.
The actual process of arbitrator selection in MLB is much different from
that of the IOC in one important respect: the presence of a cohesive union to
represent the interests of athletes. In the case of MLB, the Major League
Baseball Players Association (the Players Association) has, so far, been the
counterpart and frequent obstacle to MLB's proposed ideas for changing the
current substance abuse testing and arbitration program. The current
incarnation of the Players Association was created in 1965. 5 7 Since that time,
the Players Association has introduced collective bargaining techniques to
deal with player's salary disputes and, since 1970, has instituted arbitration
as a method of dealing with player's disputes with league management.58
Over the course of the past forty years, the Players Association has come to
be widely regarded as the most powerful union in professional sports, and
the investigation. See Jim Baumbach, Yankees Notebook: Investigator Shouldn't be in
MLB, Torre Says, NEWSDAY, Apr. 8, 2006 ("To me, if you want an impartial person, you
should probably separate that person from anything having to do with baseball," [former
Yankees manager Joe] Torre said. "Not that they shouldn't be knowledgeable of it, but
any connection to the game I think is a little tough.").
54 Mitchell Report, supra note 1, at A-1.
55 Walker, supra note 51, at 4Z.
56 See generally Cheryl Nichols, Arbitrator Selection at the NASD: Investor
Perception of a Pro-Securities Industry Bias, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 63, 64
(1999) ("It is important to the legitimacy of any nonjudicial forum that it be perceived by
the participants as fair to all parties. If fairness is a concern, the arbitral forum's existence
as a viable alternative dispute resolution mechanism will be undermined.").
57 See History of the Major League Baseball Players Association,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited August 5, 2009).
58 Id.
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probably one of the most well-represented labor unions in the entire
country. 59
While the reformed CAS does mandate that at least part of its
membership be selected with the interests of the athletes in mind, this effort
has been somewhat lacking at specifying a procedure for ensuring such
equality. 60 Even if there was a procedure or a set of criteria for selecting the
"athlete representatives," one can imagine the problems this would create.
There are over thirty-five "sports" between the Summer and Winter Olympic
Games with over 400 separate events. 61 With dozens of countries represented
in the Winter Games, and hundreds in the Summer Games, it is difficult to
think that such a wide range of athletes could agree upon any sort of cohesive
union. Major League Baseball does not face any such problems. The Players
Association has proven to be both an effective check on the power of league
management and a respected institution that protects the interests of athletes.
The Players Association holds itself open to every member of an MLB roster,
as well as other individuals who have signed contracts with major league
teams, for a total of around 1,200 members.62 The Players Association has
demonstrated its willingness to strike as recently as 1994, and there have
been five strikes over the course of the Players Association existence. 63
59 ROBERT F. BURK, NEVER JUST A GAME: PLAYERS, OWNERS, AND AMERICAN
BASEBALL TO 1920 10 (1994).
60 See generally Reeb, supra note 19. The ICAS requires that one-fifth of its
membership be selected to represent the "interests of athletes," but no criteria is given as
to what sort of qualifications that would entail. Id. at xxxiii.
61 Olympic Movement Official Site, Sports,
http://www.olympic.org/uk/sports/index-uk.asp (last visited August 5, 2009).
62 See Major League Players Association: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#membership (last visited August 5, 2009)
("All players, managers, coaches and trainers who hold a signed contract with a Major
League club are eligible for membership in the Association. In collective bargaining, the
Association represents around 1,200 players, or the number of players on each club's 40-
man roster, in addition to any players on the disabled list.").
63 Id. While the Players Association has been overwhelmingly successful in the
arbitration of disputes relating to contracts and salaries of Major League Players, it has
been placed at somewhat of a disadvantage in substance abuse setting. The Mitchell
Report described at some length the difficulty in which Senator Mitchell had in speaking
to players about the steroids culture around the league. See Mitchell Report, supra note 1,
at SR-7. The image that has emerged in the minds of most fans and commentators is that
the league office is primarily interested in "cleaning up" the game while the Players
Association resists such efforts through encouraging its members to remain silent and not
speak to investigators. Id.
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The guidelines that inform MLB's substance abuse arbitration procedure
are spelled out in the Joint Drug Agreement. 64 Immediately after a positive
test for a banned substance, the Independent Medical Examiner must notify
the Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC). 65 The HPAC then notifies
both the player who has tested positive, as well as their club, of the test
result.66 The HPAC is made up for four individuals-two licensed physicians
and two bar-certified attorneys. 67 Both the Players Association and the
League office have the right to designate one physician and one attorney
each. 68 The makeup of the HPAC is detailed on their website:
The Health Policy Advisory Committee ("HPAC") is responsible for
administering and overseeing the Program. HPAC shall be composed of one
medical representative ("Medical Representative") from each of the Parties
(both of whom shall be licensed physicians expert in the diagnosis and
treatment of chemical use and abuse problems), and one other
representative each from the Office of the Commissioner and the
Association (both of whom shall be licensed attorneys). 69
The HPAC is also responsible for initially designating an Independent
Medical Examiner, usually a laboratory specializing in performance-
enhancing substance abuse detection, which will carry out the individual
tests.70 If the HPAC cannot agree upon an Independent Medical Examiner,
then an ad hoc member of the HPAC must be agreed upon by the four
individuals mentioned above within forty-eight hours. 71
The HPAC hearing is only the first stop for a player who wishes to take
his substance abuse case through to arbitration. The HPAC's mandate is
somewhat broad-it sets the schedule for testing, rules on what procedures
shall be used, rules on whether new testing procedures will be allowed or not,
and is charged with educating all players on the dangers of substance
64 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program
[hereinafter Joint Drug Agreement], available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/joint-drug_prevention-and-treatmentprogram_2005
.pdf.
65 Id. There is no clarification in the Joint Drug Agreement as to which members
shall be contacted first, in what order, or even if all members of the HPAC will be
contacted at the same time.
66 1d. at7.
67 Id. at 1.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 64, at 2.
71 Id. at 1.
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abuse. 72 Despite this overly broad mandate, the HPAC has no disciplinary
powers over players who have turned in a positive test result. 73 Their scope
of involvement with the players, after a positive test has occurred, is limited
to putting them on the "administrative" or "clinical" track.74 Clinical track
athletes are those who have tested positive for the use of non-enhancement
drugs, such as cocaine or marijuana. Athletes who have used drugs that have
been deemed by Major League Baseball to enhance performance are
immediately placed upon the administrative track.75 If they then wish to
arbitrate their case, they must petition the league's central arbitration
office. 76
In practice, arbitrator selection in the MLB system is governed by one
principle: parity between the Players Association and the MLB league office.
This overarching goal is apparent when one considers the procedures that a
player who tested positive for a banned substance would face. While these
efforts at equalizing power between MLB and the Players Association are
one method for achieving objectivity in the arbitration proceeding, they also
serve to reinforce the notion that the outcome of a player's case will depend
on which party's nominated arbitrator will hear the case, instead of the guilt
or innocence of the individual.77 In a substance abuse arbitration setting,
which bears so many similarities to a criminal procedure, the reinforcement
of this idea is contrary to the league's efforts in setting up a "fair" system in
which to arbitrate. Rather, the league should gear its system towards one that
would lead parties to think that arbitration will be fair no matter who hears
their case. Considering the impact that the HPAC has upon the ultimate
decision of a player, MLB should consider a three-party model of arbitrator
selection, adjusted to keep the number of individuals involved at five.
Changing the structure of the HPAC is perhaps the most important step that
7 2 Id. at2.
73 Id. at3.
74 Id. at2.
75 Id. at7.
76 Only one player has thus far appealed his case all the way to the League's
arbitration office. Rafael Palmeiro submitted his case to a league arbitration panel and
was denied. See Jeff Barker, Palmeiro Provided No Details About Test: Result Was Not
Explained in Arbitration, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 19, 2005, at IA.
77 See generally Elizabeth A. Murphy, Standards of Arbitrator Impartiality: How
Impartial Must They Be?, 1996 J. DisP. RESOL. 463, 463 (1996) ("One of the most crucial
aspects of the arbitrator's role is neutrality. For arbitration proceedings to achieve a fair
resolution of disputes, the arbitrator must make his decision without bias. All
jurisdictions allow vacation of arbitration awards where there is 'evident partiality' on the
part of an arbitrator appointed as neutral.").
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MLB can take, considering that it is the only step that most players who turn
in a positive test will ever experience. 78
Three-party arbitrator selection allows each side to nominate an even
number of individuals who cannot be peremptorily challenged by the
opposing party, which MLB already does in the HPAC.79 The selected
representatives then choose a fifth individual, who will act as the chairperson
for the arbitration hearing. The advantage to this model is that neither party's
appointed representative has control over the arbitration:
Where an arbitration uses a three-arbitrator panel, as is common in
commercial arbitration, each party has the right of direct selection of a
single arbitrator, and the two arbitrators selected usually have joint
responsibility for the selection of a third. As a result, each party is ensured
that there is at least one representative on the panel reflecting his own
desired approach to the subjects in dispute with a second having no
significant objections to it. On the other hand, if a single arbitrator is used in
a dispute, he will usually be selected through agreement of the parties, again
allowing both parties to ensure that their views will receive full
consideration. 80
Switching the HPAC to a system in which the representatives selected by
each party would then select a chairperson for the proceedings would allow
each party to still have an adequate voice in the procedure, but place less
importance on which party's nominee would be the ultimate decisionmaker.
III. PROCEDURAL RULES AND REGULATIONS IN SUBSTANCE
ABUSE ARBITRATION
One reason why substance abuse might be a particularly difficult subject
with regards to arbitration system design is the fact that so much of the
resulting procedures will resemble a criminal trial. While MLB arbitrators
are not likely to hand down jail sentences anytime soon, the use of most of
the substances on the league's "prohibited" list is also punishable by federal
law. 81 Senator Mitchell recommended in his report that MLB start
78 To date, Rafael Palmeiro is the only individual to appeal the punishment given to
him for violating the league's substance abuse rules to an arbitration panel beyond the
HPAC. See Barker, supra note 76, at IA.
79 See Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 64.
80 Tony Cole, Commercial Arbitration in Japan: Contributions to the Debate on
Japanese "Non-Litigousness", 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 29, 99 (2007).
81 A list of the substances that have been banned by the league is listed on the Joint
Drug Agreement, supra note 64, at 23. A short glance at the list will show that most, if
not all, of the substances are illegal, or illegal without a valid doctor's prescription. Id.
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cooperating with law enforcement officials more readily, perhaps signaling a
willingness on the part of MLB to turn players who use illegal substances
over to the authorities:
Recently, law enforcement agencies have become increasingly flexible and
creative in sharing with professional sports organizations information
gathered during investigations. This practice makes sense because law
enforcement agencies typically focus their efforts in illegal drug
investigations on prosecution of the manufacturers, importers, and
distributors, not on the athletes who are the end users. During these
investigations, however, law enforcement agencies often accumulate
evidence of use by individuals. 82
Even without the threat of criminal action, MLB has handed down some
hefty suspensions in the past over substance abuse, and these suspensions are
without pay under the drug agreement currently in effect.83 When one
considers the amount of money that most MLB players make in a single
season, the arbitration panels are handling cases that concern hundreds of
thousands and sometimes millions of dollars in lost earnings.84 Besides the
monetary implications, the negative publicity surrounding a player who is
accused of substance abuse has consequences for the player's future
contracts and reputation. One of the most controversial aspects of the Court
of Arbitration for Sports' operations, and perhaps the one that relates most
directly to the problems facing Major League Baseball, has been the presence
of the ad hoc division at every Olympiad since the 1996 Atlanta Summer
Games.85 The procedural rules that govern the hearings of this arbitration
panel, as well as an atmosphere where some have suggested that the
arbitrators are more likely to be influenced by the IOC, have led to some
harsh criticism of the ad hoc arbitration panel as offensive to the concept of
fairness and due process. 86
82 See Mitchell Report, supra note 1, at 290.
83 To date, the longest suspension handed down to an MLB player is eighty days,
which was handed down to Detroit Tigers infielder Neifi Perez after his third positive
steroid test. ESPN.com, Tigers' Perez Tests Positive for Stimulant for Third Time, Aug.
4, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/storyid=2960193 (last visited August 5,
2009). The total amount of salary lost during Perez' previous and final suspensions
combined was $1,188,525. Id.
84 See Id.
85 See generally Richard McLaren, Introducing the Court of Arbitration for Sport:
The Ad Hoc Division at the Olympic Games, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 515 (2001).
86 See generally Andrew Goldstone, Note, Obstruction of Justice: The Arbitration
Process for Anti-Doping Violations During the Olympic Games, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 361 (2006) (offering an overall criticism of the ad hoc division as an
impingement upon the due process rights of athletes and suggesting several reforms that,
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A. The Court ofArbitration for Sport's use of the Ad Hoc Division in
the Past has Raised Some Criticisms as to its Fairness
The first ad hoc division was in session at the 1996 Summer Games in
Atlanta from July 19 to August 4, 1996.87 The original purpose of the
Olympic Division, as it was officially called, was described by one of its
founders and its first President, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler:
In creating the Olympic Division, the CAS was pursuing the objective of
providing athletes and other participants (Federations, National Olympic
Committees, officials, trainers, doctors, etc.) with a body able to resolve
disputes occurring during the Games in a final manner within time limits
appropriate to the pace of competition .... In other words, if we were to
use media speak, the goal was to offer a fair, fast[,] and free method of
resolving disputes. 88
The new division was smaller than the full CAS body-consisting of just
twelve arbitrators with sports experience and drawn from geographically-
diverse locations.8 9 During those first Atlanta games, the ad hoc division
heard just six cases. 90
One of those cases is illustrative of the way in which arbitrations
normally took place. Michelle Smith was an Irish swimmer whose ability to
participate in the 400 meter freestyle was being challenged by the U.S.
Swimming Federation.91 The application for arbitration by the ad hoc
division was filed at 6:10 p.m. the night before the preliminary heat.92 A
three-member arbitration panel was immediately convened and summoned
before it three parties: a German delegation that supported and was
representing the U.S. position, an Irish Olympic delegation, and an IOC
while keeping the ad hoc division in place, would amend its specific procedures and
regulations).
87 GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS: ISSUES OF
FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS LAW 105 (2001).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 106. The complete list of arbitrators for the 2000 Sydney games is also
available. Id. at 42. It is an impressive assembly of figures in the sports arbitration world
to say the least and contains many of the same names listed as authoritative sources
throughout this note.
90 Id. at 1-2. Kaufmann-Kohler mentions that with the exception of one case, the
first six arbitrations heard by the ad hoc division were "reasonably straightforward." Id.
91 KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 87, at 111.
92 Id.
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representative.93 Arguments lasted until 12:30 a.m.-all the events were
witnessed and taken down by a court reporter.94 At 2:00 a.m., the arbitration
panel handed down its decision allowing Smith to compete. 95 The entire
application, hearing, and decision had taken less than eight hours. 96 If this
seems short, keep in mind that according to its own rules, the ad hoc panel is
bound to give a decision with twenty-four hours of the lodging of the
complaint.97 The 1998 Nagano Winter Games were another big step. A total
of six cases were referred to the ad hoc division-the same number as
Atlanta, but when one considers that the winter games have about a third as
many athletes and events as the Summer Games, it appeared that the ad hoc
division was becoming more widely accepted as a legitimate arbitration
body.98 There was only one doping case involved at those games in which
Canadian snowboarder Ross Rebagliati kept his gold medal despite testing
positive for marijuana after the event. 99
Although the ad hoc division has been credited with maintaining an
impartial and obviously experienced coterie of arbitrators during the games,
this is not to say that the division has been without its criticisms. Certainly
one of the most controversial aspects of the ad hoc divisions is its adherence
to the strict liability theory on doping.' 00 Strict liability theory on doping
93 Id. This, however, would not be Smith's last run-in with arbitration procedures in
sports. Two years after the Atlanta Games, she was banned by the Federation
Internationale de Natation (or FINA, swimming's governing body) from competing for
four years. Kevin Mitchell, Hot Waters Rose to Engulf Irish Rose, THE OBSERVER, Feb.
29, 2004, available at http://sport.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0, 10488,1158666,00.html.
94 KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 87, at 112.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 111-12 (The case is listed as US Swimming v. FINA. A complete copy is
listed RECUEL DES SENTENCES DU TAS, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 377
(Matthieu Reeb ed., 1998)).
97 KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 87, at 128. Article 18 specifies that an ad hoc
arbitration panel has twenty-four hours from the time of the filing of the application to
hand down a decision, although the President of the ad hoc Division can extend that time
frame if required by the circumstances. By Kaufmann-Kohler's own admission, this
would be extraordinarily rare.
98 Id. at 99.
99 Id. at 95-100 (In Rebagliati v. IOC, the arbitration panel found that because the
IOC had not reached any agreement with the International Ski Federation, a sanction for
marijuana use could not be imposed. The court did consider the fact that marijuana, if
anything, probably hurt Rebagliati's performance rather than enhanced it).
100 See Goldstone, supra note 86, at 367-86; see also Michael Straubel, Enhancing
the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court ofArbitration for Sport Can Do Its
Job Better, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1249 (2005) (Some critics have suggested that the
ad hoc division should also address concerns over jurisdiction as a judicial body acting
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maintains that if even the slightest trace of a banned substance is found
within an athlete's blood, the arbitration panel is free to assume that the
athlete in question is guilty of ingesting the drug in question-whether
knowingly or not is irrelevant.' 0' The effect is what many in America would
consider to be an unfair violation of due process-the presence of any
physical evidence shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, in this case, the
athlete. ' 0 2
Surely the most controversial example of the circumstances that can
result from the application of strict liability theory was the case of a
Romanian gymnast, Andreea Raducan. Raducan was just sixteen years old
when she won the gold medal as part of the Romanian women's gymnastics
team at the 2000 Sydney Summer Games. 10 3 Raducan's team won the gold
on September 19, 2000 and, contrary to common procedure, was not tested
for banned substances immediately following the competition. 10 4 The next
day, after complaining of a headache to her team physician, she was given
some medication for the common cold.'0 5 Unbeknownst to Raducan, and
allegedly unbeknownst to the team physician as well, the medicine that she
ingested contained pseudoephedrine-a banned substance that is a common
ingredient in over-the-counter decongestants. 0 6 Raducan competed again the
next day, September 21, in the Women's Individual All-Around event. 10 7
She ingested another pill containing pseudoephedrine before the competition
and again came away with a gold medal. 10 8 This time, Raducan was tested
immediately after the competition, and the pseudoephedrine showed up in
that test. 109 Five days later, the IOC stripped Raducan of her medal in the
Women's All-Around competition. 110 When the ad hoc arbitration panel
refused to hear her claim, Raducan filed an appeal with the Swiss Federal
Court-the same court that had cast doubt on the legitimacy of the CAS
extraterritorially in nations where they have not been mandated or approved by the
national governments).
101 See Goldstone, supra note 86, at 368-69.
102 Id.
103 KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 87, at 80 (The text that appears in Kaufmnann-
Kohler's book is the translated English version of the appeals decision handed down by
the Swiss Federal Court after Raducan appealed the ruling of the CAS ad hoc panel).
104 Id
105 Id.
106 See Goldstone, supra note 86, at 372.
107 KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 87, at 82.
108 Id.
109Id. at 82.
110 Id. at 84.
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years before in the Gundel decision.II1 The ad hoc arbitration panel's reason
for denying the case was as blunt as it was short: Raducan had ingested the
substance, it was clearly designated as banned on the IOC list, and that was
all that needed to be considered."l 2 This time, the Swiss court upheld the
arbitration panel's decision without casting any doubts as to its
independence.113
These concerns about the ad hoc division's approach to substance abuse
cases may explain the strange phenomenon at the 2004 Athens Summer
Games: during that event, the number of athletes who were accused of
doping skyrocketed-over twenty athletes were accused of doping and all of
them either had their medals revoked or their results annulled. 114 This was
either a result of more athletes using banned substances or simply a higher
percentage of athletes being caught-there were 25% more tests conducted
in Athens than there were in the 2000 Sydney Games.1 15 One would think
that this huge increase in the number of doping accusations would result in a
proportional increase in the number of cases being brought before the CAS
ad hoc panels. Despite the increase in the number of cases, however, only
one was appealed to the ad hoc division-that of Kenyan boxer David
Munyasia. 116
Munyasia's sole case that year provided another example of what some
athletes might distrust about the procedural rules of the ad hoc panels.
Munyasia had provided a urine sample to the IOC upon his arrival at the
Olympic Village-several days before he was to actually compete."17 The
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), an international organization that
conducted tests during the Athens Olympiad, informed the JOC that
Munyasia had tested positive for the banned substance cathine. The IOC
called together a disciplinary commission and informed Munyasia that he
had tested positive for a banned substance and would be expelled
immediately from the Olympic Village (and, with no visa to be in Greece
except for the Games, would be sent back home by his National Organizing
I I I Id. at 80-92.
112 See Goldstone, supra note 86, at 373. In some instances, the ad hoc division will
refuse to hear any testimony related to how a certain substance was ingested, since the
strict liability theory mandates that this information is irrelevant. Id.
113 Id
114 Richard McLaren, The CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Athens Olympic Games, 15
MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 175, 179-80 (2004) (Professor McLaren was, along with Ms.
Kaufmann-Kohler, one of the first members of the ad hoc Division).
115 Id. at 181.
116 Id. at 182.
117 Id
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Committee). 118 At that disciplinary hearing, Munyasia argued that the
positive test was either a mistake or that he had ingested cathine through an
accident. 119 He pleaded with the IOC commission to allow him to send a
sealed sample to another laboratory for independent testing-a request which
the commission denied.120
The controversial aspect of Munyasia's case was not the actual doping
accusation, but the manner in which his appeal to the CAS' ad hoc division
panel was handled.' 21 Because Munyasia had already been sent home by the
IOC, his hearing was conducted without his presence. 122 Although athletes
have their own individual rights to appeal a decision of the ad hoc division,
in reality they are often dependent upon the expertise of their national
organizing committee or the international federation for their specific sports
(e.g. Federation Internationale de Natation for swimmers) to argue before the
ad hoc panel that the athlete has a right to appeal in the first place. 123 The
effect of this dependency is that when an athlete is sent home, as Munyasia
was, it makes any subsequent appeal of that decision to the ad hoc division
virtually impossible. 124
One issue that is not a problem with the IOC ad hoc division per se is the
tendency of doping officials to make public statements regarding an athlete's
guilt before an arbitration panel has heard the case. Consider the case of
Tyler Hamilton, an American cyclist who was accused of doping during the
2004 Athens Olympic Games. 125 The testing at that event was again handled
118 SeeId. at 183.
119 Id. at 182.
120 McLaren, supra note 114, at 182. To be fair, Mr. Munyasia later admitted that he
was a regular user of Miraa-a popular, mildly addictive plant-based stimulant that is
used throughout Kenya. Miraa contains high levels of cathinone. See Samson Ateka,
Boxer Munyasia is Back, THE STANDARD, Sept. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/cl/hmnews/
news s.php?articleid= 1143958316&date=17/9/2006.
121 See McLaren, supra note 114, at 182.
122 Id. at 183. While there is no indication that Munyasia's case ever repeated itself
with another Olympic athlete, its singular occurrence is enough to raise due process
concerns.123 Id.
124 See id.
125 See generally Michael O'Connor, Doping Probe May Tarnish Tyler, BOSTON
HERALD, Sep. 22, 2004, at 004. Hamilton turned in a positive substance abuse test after
winning a gold medal at the Athens games, but his backup sample was accidentally
destroyed by the Athens laboratory that was storing it. Id. The Russian Olympic
Federation petitioned the CAS to strip him of his medal after the games and award it to a
Russian cyclist, which the CAS refused to do. Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
by WADA. 126 Before Hamilton had a chance to have his case heard before a
disciplinary body, and well before he would have had any occasion to appeal
his case to the CAS, testing officials from WADA began making public
statements condemning the cyclist.1 27 WADA Officials were essentially
taking the strict liability theory one step further-athletes were not only
deemed guilty of doping upon a positive test result, they were also deemed
worthy of public condemnation immediately after the test. For all the
advances that modem science has made in the field of drug testing, it is still
an imperfect science and mistakes still occur. With regards to Hamilton's
case:
The novel blood test used to condemn Hamilton as a cheater and suspend
him for two years was developed by researchers in Sydney, Australia, on a
$50,000 USADA grant-that sum a fraction of what's normally spent in
medicine to develop and validate a diagnostic test. "This test was not ready
for prime time," says Carlo Brugnara, professor of pathology at Harvard
Medical School. Brugnara was a member of the peer-review committee that
approved publication of an article outlining the test in 2003. However, he
felt so strongly that it was prematurely implemented in Hamilton's case that
he volunteered to testify at an arbitration hearing for the cyclist in 2005.128
It is unfair for officials from WADA or any other investigation or arbitration
service to make statements regarding the guilt or innocence of an individual
before that individual has the chance to appeal their case to an arbitration
panel.
Finally, athletes are not given a choice regarding whether or not to have
their cases heard by an arbitration panel. Since the first 1996 Atlanta Games,
any athlete who wishes to compete has to agree to binding arbitration in front
of the ad hoc division for any appeal-whether the case is doping, eligibility,
or any other issue. 129 Many critics, and even some proponents of the ad hoc
division, predicted that athletes would refuse en masse to sign the
agreement. 130 While this has not been the case, some have questioned the
126 Michael A. Hiltzlik, Cyclist Blames 'Flawed' Test, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 2006, at
A39.
127 Id. When Hamilton competed a few weeks after the Olympics, he again turned in
a positive test result and this time was convicted. The chairman of WADA, Richard W.
Pound, announced to the media "[w]e got him on the second bounce"--indicating that
Hamilton had also been guilty in Athens. Id. Whether or not Hamilton was indeed guilty
of doping in Athens if far beyond the scope of this note, but the fact that Pound publicly
announced Hamilton's guilt in Athens without a concurring test (at least one that
conformed to WADA standards) is troubling.
128 Id.
12 9 See KAuFMANN-KoHLER, supra note 87, at 103.
130Id.
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appropriateness of requiring athletes to give up certain due process rights as a
condition of competing in the Games. 131 As a corollary to this binding
agreement, and in an effort to "reduce the risk of arbitrators being
challenged" athletes are not allowed to choose the arbitrator for their case. 132
This means that athletes cannot suggest an arbitrator on their own, even if
both parties would agree that a given arbitrator should hear the case.133 For
example, if there was a dispute over the nationality of an athlete, and thus his
ability to compete for a certain nation, the parties would not be able to put
the case before an arbitrator who was also an expert in the citizenship laws of
the nation in question unless that individual was on the list of approved
arbitrators. 134
In summation, there are five procedural regulations that have raised the
most controversy for the ad hoc division over the past decade: the application
of strict liability theory without any other well-defined substantive law, the
extremely limited time frame in which decisions must be made, the
possibility of involuntary ex parte hearings, the possibility of some
arbitrators making public statements regarding the guilt or innocence of
athletes before a decision has been rendered, and the requirement that
athletes agree to arbitration if they want to compete. 135
B. Major League Baseball can Avoid the Criticisms Leveled at the Ad
Hoc Division Through Careful Examination of its own Procedures
MLB has already avoided some of the issues mentioned above through
careful planning and adherence to an arbitration agreement. MLB and the
Players Association have agreed to keep any and all information regarding a
positive steroids test strictly confidential. 136 In fact, most of the public's
knowledge of steroids disputes has arisen not from the League office itself,
but from Congressional Hearings and the accounts of former stars like Jose
131 See Goldstone, supra note 86, at 373.
132 See KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 87, at 43.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 The lack of substantive law that athletes can expect to rely upon when going
before the ad hoc division has also been a source of consternation. See Goldstone, supra
note 86, at 388-91. Richard McLaren, one of the original members of the ad hoc division,
has said that the court operates on the basis of "general principles of law and the rules of
law, the application of which it deems appropriate." See McLaren, supra note 114, at
521-23. This aspect, combined with the lack of appeals, effectively makes the ad hoc
division the judge, jury, and appeals court.
136 KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 87, at 113.
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Canseco and trainers like Brian MacNamee. 137 The League itself has never
been accused of disseminating information to the press regarding steroids
testing or making a public statement condemning a player before that player
has had a chance to appeal his case before an arbitration panel. 138 This is a
marked improvement from WADA's recent habit of publicly accusing
athletes of wrongdoing before any sort of hearing has occurred. One
procedure of the HPAC, however, could be deemed to be a public statement
regarding guilt or innocence even without saying as much. When a player
first turns in a positive steroids test, they are placed on either the "clinical" or
"administrative" track. 139 This initial designation can also be understood as a
quasi-declaration of a player's innocence or guilt. Clinical track athletes have
the connotation of addicts who need treatment while administrative track
athletes are seen as cheaters who deserve to be punished. This separation
ignores the reality that most of the prohibited substances on Major League
Baseball's list, including anabolic steroids, are highly addictive:
Physically, many athletes experience severe depression following cessation
of the drug similar to that of any other drug addict. Psychologically, steroid
use can be compulsive and unstoppable, in what has been termed by the
medical community as "reverse anorexia." The steroid users have an
uncontrollable obsession with being big instead of skinny. This obsession
results in the continuing or increased usage of anabolic steroids. 140
The immense consequences that the HPAC's distinction will have upon the
player who has tested positive for a banned substance is all the more reason
137 Jose Canseco, a former major league star, might be credited with bringing the
steroids controversy in baseball to a head when he published "Juiced: Wild Times,
Rampant 'Roids, Smash Hits and How Baseball Got Big". Michael O'Keefe, Canseco's
Book Names Steroid Users, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 2005, at Cl. In that book,
Canseco claimed to have personally injected some of the league's biggest stars. Id. Brian
McNamee, a former trainer, made headlines when he named star pitcher Roger Clemens,
among others, as abusers of performance-enhancing drugs in front of Congress. Lance
Pugmire & Bill Shaikin, Evidence Against Clemens Submitted, THE STAR-LEDGER, Feb.
7, 2008, at 55.
138 MLB Commissioner Bud Selig has expressed his faith in the ability of Senator
Mitchell to deliver an unbiased report, but he has wisely refrained from commenting on
the guilt or innocence of any player named in the report. See Statement of Commissioner
Allan H. Selig Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Jan.
15, 2008, available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080115114736.pdf.
139 See Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 64.
140 Jim Thurston, Chemical Warfare: Battling Steroids in Athletics, 1 MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. 93, 107 (1990). Senator Mitchell notes in his report that, in some studies, individuals
who are addicted to steroids exhibit identical symptoms to addicts of other harmful drugs.
See Mitchell Report, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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to closely evaluate the fairness and balance of MLB's arbitration procedures
as described above.
MLB also places severe time limitations upon an athlete who is
considering whether or not to appeal his case any further than the "clinical"
or "administrative" ruling of the HPAC and the punishment that the League
hands down. The player who has been notified of his positive test result has
only forty-eight hours to inform the HPAC whether or not he will challenge
the positive test results. 141 Players who might want to check with their own
medical examiner or a physician to see if anything they may have ingested
would have caused a positive test result will have only forty-eight hours to
complete their own investigation and decide whether or not to appeal their
case before the arbitration panel. While the baseball season is not endless, it
does not have nearly the kind of time constraints as an Olympiad. 142 In the
case of Major League Baseball, the League should consider extending the
time to consider whether or not to appeal a positive steroids test to a week or
even longer. This will allow players who may not be sure about whether or
not they have a tenable defense to conduct an investigation on their own if
they wish to do so. 143
IV. THE DIVISION OF THE HPAC FROM MLB's STANDARD
ARBITRATION PANELS
Another issue facing MLB is the practice of divorcing the decisions of
the institution most familiar with the League's substance abuse policies and
procedures-the HPAC-from the institution that will make the final
decision regarding a player's guilt or innocence in a substance-abuse hearing.
The HPAC's influence ends at the point where a player has turned in a
positive substance-abuse test.144 From this point forward, the claim will be
handled by MLB's standard arbitration office-the same office that regularly
deals with salary disputes. 145 The selection of arbitrators at this level,
however, is different from that of the HPAC:'
141 Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 64, at 12.
142 Major League Baseball's 2009 season will consist of 162 regular season
games-not including preseason or the playoffs. See Major League Baseball 2009
Schedule, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/schedule/#20090705. The season will
start March 30 and stretch though October. Id.
143 If this situation seems far-fetched, keep in mind the circumstance of Andrea
Raducan, the Romanian gymnast. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
144 See Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 64. Thus far, this has not been an issue
since only one player has taken his case past the HPAC to league's arbitration office.
145 Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Typically, labor and management use the services of the private, nonprofit
American Arbitration Association (AAA) or the public Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service (FMCS). Both "appointing agencies maintain
rosters of acceptable arbitrators, persons with extensive experience in labor
relations who are neutral on labor-management issues. On request, the
parties receive a list of seven arbitrators in their region. The parties strike
the names of unacceptable candidates in turn, leaving the remaining person
as their selected neutral. 146
It should be noted that the League's standard arbitration practice deals
overwhelmingly with salary dispute arbitration over the course of a given
season. 147 Their expertise in matters of substance-abuse disputes is thus
relatively limited. The HPAC is not required to, and there is no indication
that the League would require that institution to, testify at any arbitration
panel hearing. It seems odd that the party with the most expertise in a given
subject matter, which is also the party that has dealt with the player and
testing administrators up until this point, would not be included in the actual
arbitration hearing itself. The arbitration panel itself is thus at a disadvantage
because it cannot rely upon the expertise and wisdom of the HPAC-both in
dealing with substance abuse disputes in general and in the specific case at
bar.
V. CONCLUSION
Many of the problems and criticisms that have been raised with regards
to the IOC's arbitration system for substance abuse are not an issue for MLB
because of the differences between the two institutions, or are not a problem
because of the ways in which MLB's arbitration procedure differs from that
of the IOC. So far, MLB has not faced much in the way of criticisms
regarding its own substance abuse arbitration structure. This is perhaps not
surprising, considering how few players have actually chosen to go through
the arbitration process. 148 However, the lack of a pre-existing controversy
should not prevent MLB from examining and reformulating its procedures so
as to solve problems before they happen:
Many contracts now address possible future disputes by specifying the
resolution procedure. Some forward-looking organizations have begun
146 ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 120-21 (1998).
Abrams also notes that although thousands of arbitrators are maintained on both the AAA
and FMCS lists, in practice only about sixty of the most senior arbitrators, usually trained
in law or economics, will handle such a dispute. Id. at 121.
147 See id. at 121-22.
148 See Barker, supra note 76, at IA.
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designing dispute resolution systems that recognize the inevitability of
conflict and the possibility of productive resolution. Most of these
approaches require the application of problem-solving and facilitation skills
similar to those used in mediation. Persistent, unresolved conflict is
expensive in many ways. When disputes are recognized early, more options
exist for constructive resolution efforts. Further, the efforts have a greater
chance for lower cost and successful outcomes. The trend is clearly toward
early recognition of conflict and either proactive anticipatory efforts or early
intervention. ADR processes and skills provide helpful options. 149
Considering the unique nature of substance abuse cases before arbitration
bodies, and the already-existing HPAC that has extensive medical knowledge
regarding such abuses, the League should establish a new, independent wing
of the standard arbitration office that will be tasked with exclusive
jurisdiction over substance abuse disputes in MLB. To this point, MLB has
let the United States Congress do much of the work for it as far as hearings
and tribunals are concerned. If the League administration is serious about
cracking down on the substance abuse problem that pervades the current
atmosphere of the League, then it must be prepared to accept responsibility
and arbitrate the cases themselves in a way that will ensure fairness. This
new arbitration body should also consider what procedural rules and
regulations will apply in its handling of cases, keeping in mind the
tribulations of the IOC and its ad hoc division so as to avoid the same
criticisms.
The effect of the Mitchell Report on the atmosphere of baseball is not
fully certain yet-the season has not yet started and many active players
named in the report have not been disciplined yet by the League. The fact
that no player named in the Mitchell Report has been brought before a
disciplinary review board of MLB yet may mean that baseball is hoping the
Report alone was enough to clean up the game. 150 What the report does make
clear is that MLB players feel unfairly targeted by the League's efforts in
investigating and punishing substance abuse. This atmosphere of distrust and
149 Steve Mains, Alternative Dispute Resolution: What's Next?, 26 COLO. LAW. 53,
54 (1997); see also Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Vanishing Trial: Land Mine on the
Mediation Landscape or Opportunity for Evolution: Ruminations on the Future of
Mediation Practice, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 27, 73 (2005) ("Rather than react to
what has happened, the mediation community must realize that change is probable and
take a proactive role in the redesign of mediation and additional processes.").
150 As of March 13, 2008, none of the players listed in the Mitchell Report have
been questioned by MLB authorities since Cleveland Indians pitcher Paul Byrd was
questioned on December 17, 2007. Baseball Notebook, Report Gets Slow Response,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.boston.com/sports/baseball/articles/2008/03/13/report-gets-slow-response/.
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hostility between the League office and the Players Association will surely
be at the fore of any substance abuse arbitration in the future. The structure
of these proceedings can thus greatly impact the ways in which both parties
perceive the fairness of the outcome. Most strikes in the history of MLB have
evolved from some disagreement as to basic fairness between the League
office and the players-whether it is a dispute on salaries, free agency, or any
other aspect of the business of baseball. 151 Given the distrust and ill feelings
towards the game that fans and the media already feel, it is imperative that
MLB avoid a situation that would give players reason to strike. MLB should
amend its substance abuse arbitration procedure now or risk the same
problems faced by the International Olympic Committee.
151 See Paul Staudohar, The Baseball Strike of 1994-95, 120 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
21, 21-26 (1996). Since 1966, there have been five strikes initiated by the Players
Association. See Major League Baseball Players Association: Frequently Asked
Questions, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#1966 (last visited August 5, 2009).
The owners have also locked out the players, effectively stopping the season, since that
time. Id.
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